December 2, 1987
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
In response to congressional requests as set forth in Public Law 99 - 145, I am forwarding herewith classified and unclassified versions of the Administration's report to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. (Detailed classified briefings will be available to the Congress in the near future.)
The information contained in this report, in addition to that provided in our previous reports, is essential to understanding the problems we face in seeking to achieve sound, equitable and verifiable agreements for arms reductions that will strengthen our security and that of our allies.
The Soviet Union to date has not corrected its noncompliance activities. Indeed, since the last report, there has been an additional case of Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty in the deployment of an ABM radar at Gomel, and other violations are continuing.
No violations of a treaty can be considered to be a minor matter, nor can there be confidence in agreements if a country can pick and choose which provisions of an agreement it will comply with. The Gomel violation can be quickly corrected by the Soviet Union if it so chooses. We are urging them to take the actions needed to do so, and to resolve other longstanding violations, especially that of their radar located at Krasnoyarsk. Correcting their violations will be a true test of Soviet willingness to enter a more constructive relationship and broaden the basis for cooperation between our two countries on security matters.
I am confident the Congress fully shares my concern about Soviet noncompliance. Congressional support and consensus on this issue is an essential element of our efforts to secure corrective actions, and pursue the kind of arms reductions agreements that will best serve the interests of the United States and the world.
Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements
At the request of Congress, I am submitting this report on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements. This Report represents another in a series of reports to Congress by this Administration regarding this serious issue. The series includes Reports dated January 1984, February and December 1985, March 1987, and the 1984 Report on Soviet Noncompliance prepared for me by the independent General Advisory Committee on Arms Control. Each of these reports has enumerated and documented, in detail, issues of Soviet noncompliance and our attempts to resolve the issues. Likewise, this Report addresses questions of Soviet noncompliance with existing arms control agreements, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, and the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Now that we have put the SALT I Interim Agreement and the SALT II Treaty behind us, Soviet activities with respect to those agreements are not treated in this Report. I will report on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty at a later date. The provisions of the Helsinki Final Act that relate to military security and confidence-building have been superseded by the Stockholm Document, a development that is treated later in this introduction. When taken as a whole, this series of reports provides a clear picture of continuing Soviet violations and forms the basis for our concern that future agreements must be effectively verifiable and complied with.
In the December 23, 1985, Report, I stated:
The Administrations's most recent studies support its conclusion that there is a pattern of Soviet noncompliance. As documented in this and previous reports, the Soviet Union has violated its legal obligation under, or political commitment to, the SALT I ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement, the SALT II Agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, and the Helsinki Final Act. In addition, the USSR has likely violated provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.
I further stated:
At the same time as the Administration has reported its concerns and findings to the Congress, the United States has had extensive exchanges with the Soviet Union on Soviet noncompliance in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), where SALT-related issues (including ABM issues) are discussed, and through other appropriate diplomatic channels.
The compliance concerns enumerated in this Report are not unfamiliar to the Soviet Union. I expressed my personal interest in these issues directly to General Secretary Gorbachev during my meetings with him, both in 1985 in Geneva and then again in Reykjavik in October 1986. In addition, the Standing Consultative Commission discusses compliance concerns in detail during its biannual sessions. The classified Report includes detailed summaries of this SCC dialogue. Most recently, Secretary of State Shultz raised U.S. concerns about Soviet noncompliance during his October 1987 visit to Moscow.
Additional time has passed and, despite these continuing intensive efforts and the critical stage we have entered in the negotiation of arms reductions of historic proportion, the Soviet Union has failed to correct its noncompliant activities; neither have they provided explanations sufficient to alleviate our concerns on other compliance issues. Indeed, recent Soviet activities at an electronics facility at Gomel have raised an additional compliance issue with regard to the ABM Treaty.
Compliance with treaty obligations is a cornerstone of international law; States are to observe and comply with obligations they have freely undertaken. In fact, in December 1985, the General Assembly of the United Nations recognized the importance of treaty compliance for future arms control, when, by a vote of 131 - 0 (with 16 abstentions), it passed a resolution that:
Urges all parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to comply with their provisions;
Calls upon those parties to consider the implications of noncompliance for international security and stability and for the prospects for further progress in the field of disarmament; and
Appeals to all UN members to support efforts to resolve noncompliance questions "with a view toward encouraging strict observance of the provisions subscribed to and maintaining or restoring the integrity of arms limitation or disarmament agreements.''
Congress has made clear its concern about Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. In February 1987, the Senate passed a resolution, by a vote of 93 - 2, which:
. . . Declares that an important obstacle to the achievement of acceptable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union has been its violation of existing agreements, and calls upon it to take steps to rectify its violation of such agreements and, in particular, to dismantle the newly-constructed radar site at Krasnoyarsk, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, since it is a clear violation of the terms of the Anti-Ballistic Treaty . . .
The Senate repeated its call for dismantlement of the Krasnoyarsk radar in a resolution dated September 16, 1987. For its part, the House of Representatives, on May 6, 1987, voted 416 - 0 in support of a resolution recognizing that by constructing the Krasnoyarsk radar, the Soviet Union was in violation of its legal obligations under the ABM Treaty.
Compliance with arms control commitments remains an essential element of my arms control policy. As I have stated before:
In order for arms control to have meaning and credibly contribute to national security, it is essential that all parties to agreements fully comply with them. Strict compliance with all provisions of arms control agreements is fundamental, and this Administration will not accept anything less.
I have also said that:
Soviet noncompliance is a serious matter. It calls into question important security benefits from arms control, and could create new security risks. It undermines the confidence essential to an effective arms control process in the future . . . The United States Government has vigorously pressed, and will continue to press these compliance issues with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels.
Despite these continuous efforts, I regret to report that during the period since my last Report, the Soviet Union has failed to correct its noncompliance activity or to provide explanations sufficient to alleviate our concerns. Soviet explanations and actions are fully described in the Report. The Report presents and distinguishes between both violations and possibly noncompliant actions which are historical in nature and instances of ongoing and new noncompliant behavior.
The ABM Treaty
We continue to have deep concerns about Soviet noncompliance with the ABM Treaty. One of our principal concerns is with the Krasnoyarsk radar which is a clear violation of the Treaty. The radar demonstrates that the Soviets were designing and programming a prospective violation of the ABM Treaty even while they were negotiating a new agreement on strategic offensive weapons with the United States.
The only permitted functions for a large, phased-array radar (LPAR) with a location and orientation such as that of the Krasnoyarsk radar would be space-tracking and national technical means (NTM) of verification. Based on conclusive evidence, however, we judge that this radar is primarily designed for ballistic missile detection and tracking, not for space-tracking and NTM as the Soviets claim. Moreover, the coverage of the Krasnoyarsk radar closes a major gap in the coverage of the Soviet ballistic missile detection, warning, and tracking screen. Its location allows it to provide warning of a ballistic missile attack, to acquire attack characterization data that will enable the Soviet strategic forces to respond in a timely manner, and that could aid in planning the battle for Soviet defensive forces.
All LPARs, such as the Krasnoyarsk radar, have the inherent capability to track large numbers of objects accurately. Thus, they not only could perform as ballistic missile detection, warning, and tracking radars, but also have an inherent technical potential, depending on location and orientation, of contributing to ABM battle management.
LPARs have always been considered to be the long lead-time element of a possible territorial defense. Taken together, the Krasnoyarsk radar and other Soviet ABM-related activities give us concern that the Soviet Union may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. Some of the activities, such as the construction of new LPARs on the periphery of the Soviet Union and the upgrade of the Moscow ABM system, appear to be consistent with the ABM Treaty. The redundancy in coverage provided by these new radars and the disposition of these radars closely resembles the design of the U.S. Safeguard ABM program. The construction of the radar near Krasnoyarsk and the deployment of a Flat Twin and a Pawn Shop outside a permitted ABM system deployment area or designated ABM test range are violations of the ABM Treaty. Other Soviet ABM-related activities involve potential or probable Soviet violations or other ambiguous activity. These other issues, discussed fully in the body of the report, are:
The testing and development of components required for an ABM system that could be deployed to a site in months rather than years, and the movement of parts of Flat Twin and Pawn Shop to a new location;
The concurrent operation of air defense components and ABM components;
The development of modern air defense systems that may have some ABM capabilities;
The demonstration of an ability to reload ABM launchers in a period of time short enough to cause us concern as to Soviet capabilities and intent; and
The locating of parts of a Flat Twin and Pawn Shop at a location that is neither a permitted ABM deployment area nor an agreed test range.
Soviet activities during the past year have contributed to our concerns. Construction is continuing on three additional LPARs similar to the Krasnoyarsk radar. These new radars are located near the periphery of the western USSR and oriented consistent with the ABM Treaty's provisions on ballistic missile early warning radars (if they are for early warning). The primary mission of these radars is ballistic missile detection and tracking.
The Soviets have sought recently to convey the impression that they are addressing our concerns in a responsible fashion, but have not taken any actions which in fact redress our concerns regarding their possible preparation of a territorial defense. For example, on September 5, 1987, a U.S. Congressional Delegation was permitted to visit the Krasnoyarsk radar. Although the Soviet invitation represented a departure from the long Soviet history of secrecy in such matters, the observations of the Congressional Delegation regarding the stage of construction, the quality of construction, and other features of the radar in no way change the assessment that the radar is designed for ballistic missile detection and tracking. The radar is unquestionably an LPAR, whose location and orientation are inconsistent with the ABM Treaty.
In recent years, we have gathered an increased amount of evidence on activities that could be associated with Soviet concurrent operations. This may or may not indicate an increase in Soviet concurrent operations. Also of significant concern is the initial deployment in the western USSR to Soviet ground forces of the SA - 12 defensive system, a variant of which has been tested against tactical ballistic missiles and may have some ABM capability.
Our continuing reexamination of Soviet ABM-related activities demonstrates that the Soviets have not corrected their outstanding violation, the Krasnoyarsk radar. With regard to Krasnoyarsk, on October 23, General Secretary Gorbachev told Secretary of State Shultz that the Soviets were imposing a one-year construction moratorium on Krasnoyarsk. Although activities at Krasnoyarsk continue to be noted, the remaining work needed on the radar is interior work, so that it would be difficult to ascertain whether the Soviets have indeed ceased construction at the site.
The absence of Soviet dismantlement of the Krasnoyarsk radar, the new violation in the deployment of the Flat Twin and Pawn Shop observed at Gomel, and the totality of Soviet ABM-related activities in 1987 and previous years, suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.
The Soviet Union clearly continues to increase its capability to deploy an ABM defense. The Soviet programs involved a much greater investment of plant space, capital and manpower than comparable U.S. programs. As I said in the December 1985, Report, a unilateral Soviet ABM defense:
would have profound implications for the vital East-West balance. A unilateral Soviet territorial ABM capability acquired in violation of the ABM Treaty could erode our deterrent and leave doubts about its credibility
Chemical, Biological and Toxin Weapons
The integrity of the arms control process is also hurt by Soviet violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Information obtained in 1987 does nothing to allay our concern about Soviet noncompliance with these important agreements. Progress toward an agreement banning chemical weapons is affected by Soviet noncompliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Because of the record of Soviet noncompliance with past agreements, we believe verification provisions are a matter of unprecedented importance in our efforts to rid the world of these heinous weapons -- weapons of mass destruction under international law.
The U.S. has determined that the Soviet Union has maintained an active offensive biological warfare program and capability. Until recently, the Soviet Union has never acknowledged that it conducted even permitted BW-related activities other than to say that it had been in compliance with its obligations under the BWC.
As a result of the 1986 BWC Review Conference, States party to the Convention agreed to exchange information on facilities built for high-risk (high-containment) biological experiments and facilities engaged in other activities relating to the convention. The Soviet submission is an unprecedented public declaration of permitted Soviet BW-related facilities and is a welcome step.
An example of the discrepancy between Soviet public and private arms control diplomacy is the recent Soviet treatment of our concerns regarding an outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk in 1979. The U.S. has evidence that the outbreak occurred as a result of an accidental release of large quantities of anthrax spores from a prohibited BW facility, contributing to our concerns about the Soviet BW program. We have raised the issue repeatedly with the Soviets as early as March 1980, and have been told that the outbreak stemmed from the consumption of contaminated meat.
Since the 1986 BWC Review Conference, the Soviets have provided additional details regarding the incident in various informal public fora. However, the Soviet account is inconsistent with information available to us, and in many aspects is not consistent with a contaminated meat explanation.
Again, while we welcome the provision of new information and the opportunity to discuss these issues, our concerns regarding the Soviet biological warfare program and capability are unassuaged. The Soviets have maintained a prohibited offensive biological warfare capability. It may include advanced biological agents about which we have little knowledge and against which we have no defense. The Soviets continue to expand their chemical and toxin warfare capabilities, contrary to their public claims. Neither NATO retaliatory nor defensive programs can begin to match the Soviet effort. And, even though there have been no confirmed reports of attacks with lethal chemical, biological or toxin agents since 1984, previous activities have provided the Soviets with valuable testing, development, and operational experience.
The record of Soviet noncompliance with the treaties on nuclear testing is of legal and military concern. Since the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) came into force over 20 years ago, the Soviet Union has conducted its nuclear weapons test program in a manner incompatible with the aims of the Treaty. That conduct regularly resulted in the release of nuclear debris into the atmosphere beyond the borders of the USSR. When the Soviets ended their unilateral nuclear testing moratorium on February 26, 1987, they resumed their pattern of noncompliance with treaties on nuclear testing by conducting the test in a way which resulted in the release of radioactive matter into the atmosphere beyond the borders of the USSR. Even though the material from these Soviet tests does not pose calculable health, safety or environmental risks, and these infractions have no apparent military significance, our repeated attempts to discuss these occurrences with Soviet authorities have been rebuffed. The United States presented demarches to the Soviets on two separate occasions of unambiguous venting in 1987 and received completely unacceptable explanations. Soviet refusal to discuss this matter calls into question their sincerity on the whole range of arms control agreements.
During their 1985 - 86 moratorium, the Soviets undoubtedly maintained their test sites because they quickly resumed testing and have since conducted a series of tests. One of these tests raised sufficient concern about Soviet compliance with the 150 kt limit of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) that the U.S. raised the issue with the Soviets
In the March 1987 Report we reaffirmed the December 1985 U.S. Government judgment that, ``Soviet nuclear testing activities for a number of tests constitute a likely violation of legal obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.'' We also reported that the finding would stand until a number of studies, which had been initiated in an attempt to provide a somewhat improved basis for assessing Soviet compliance, could be completed. While significant progress has been made on those technically difficult issues, we do not expect to provide an update until next spring.
The United States and the Soviet Union have met several times at the experts level to discuss the broad range of issues relating to nuclear testing. In a joint statement issued at the time of the September 1987 meeting between Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, the two sides indicated their intention to design and conduct joint verification experiments at each other's test sites. On November 9, 1987, the United States and Soviet Union began full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations in which the first step is to agree on effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the U.S-U.S.S.R. TTBT and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). As a result of this first round of discussions, arrangements are being made for preliminary visits to each side's test sites.
The Helsinki Final Act
The Accord reached at the 1986 Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures containing new standards for notification, observation, and verification of military activities, including on-site inspection, went into effect January 1, 1987. To date, Soviet military activity forecasts, subsequent notifications, and the acceptance of requests for two inspections have been consistent with their obligations under the new agreement. The Soviets have provided the minimum information required and have, therefore, remained within the scope of their obligations. In view of this and without any new evidence, this compliance issue will not be treated in this report. However, we have exercised our prerogative for on-site inspection and will be carefully monitoring Soviet compliance with these new standards. While this Accord appears to be a step in the right direction, we must continue to seek further confidence and security building measures.
Compliance and Arms Control
A consistent and fundamental priority of my Administration has been achieving deep and equitable reductions in the nuclear offensive arsenals of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. That goal is closer to reality than it has ever been in the history of mankind, but it will be achieved only if effective verification and total compliance are integral elements of the process both with respect to existing arms control agreements and possible new ones.
We must insist on effective verification of the provisions of these new agreements, respond appropriately to any Soviet noncompliance, and continue to make our strategic decisions based on the nature and magnitude of the Soviet threat. A double standard of compliance with arms control obligations is unacceptable.
I look forward to continued close consultations with the Congress as we seek to make progress in resolving compliance issues and in negotiating sound arms control agreements.
The findings on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements follow.
Anti-Ballistic Missile (abm) Treaty
Treaty Status: The 1972 ABM Treaty and its Protocol ban deployment of ABM systems except that each Party is permitted to deploy one ABM system around its national capital area or, alternatively, at a single ICBM deployment area. The ABM Treaty is in force and is of indefinite duration. Soviet actions not in accord with the ABM Treaty are, therefore, violations of a legal obligation
1. The Krasnoyarsk Radar
Obligation: To preclude the development of a territorial defense or providing the base for a territorial ABM defense, the ABM Treaty provides that radars for early warning of ballistic missile attack may be deployed only at locations along the periphery of the national territory of each Party and that they be oriented outward. The Treaty permits deployment (without regard to location or orientation) of large phased-array radars for purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification of compliance with arms control agreements.
Issue: The March 1987 Report examined the issue of whether the Krasnoyarsk radar meets the provisions of the ABM Treaty governing phased-array radars. We have reexamined this issue.
Finding: The U.S. Government reaffirms the conclusion in the March 1987 Report that the new large phased-array radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk constitutes a violation of legal obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 in that in its associated siting, orientation, and capability, it is prohibited by this Treaty. Construction continued in 1987. The absence of credible alternative explanations have reinforced our assessment of its purpose. Despite U.S. requests, no corrective action has been taken. This and other ABM-related activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.
2. Mobility of ABM System Components
Obligation: Paragraph 1 of Article V of the ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, or deployment of mobile land-based ABM systems or components.
Issue: The March 1987 Report examined whether the Soviet Union has developed a mobile land-based ABM system, or components for such a system, in violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. We have reexamined this issue and considered the impact of the Soviet actions at Gomel.
Finding: The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment of the March 1987 Report that the evidence on Soviet actions with respect to ABM component mobility is ambiguous, but that the USSR's development and testing of components of an ABM system, which apparently are designed to be deployable at sites requiring relatively limited special-purpose site preparation, represent a potential violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. The recent movement of parts of a Flat Twin and Pawn Shop reinforces our concerns about ABM system component mobility. This and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.
3. Concurrent Testing of ABM and Air Defense Components
Obligation: The ABM Treaty and its Protocol limit the Parties to one ABM deployment area. In addition to the ABM systems and components at that one deployment area, the Parties may have ABM systems and components for development and testing purposes so long as they are located at agreed test ranges. The Treaty also prohibits giving components, other than ABM system components, the capability ``to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory'' and prohibits the Parties from testing them ``in an ABM mode.'' The Parties agreed that the concurrent testing of SAM and ABM system components is prohibited
Issue: The March 1987 Report examined whether the Soviet Union has concurrently tested SAM and ABM system components in violation of its legal obligation since 1978 not to do so. It was the purpose of that obligation to further constrain testing of air defense systems in an ABM mode. We have reexamined this issue.
Finding: The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the March 1987 Report that the evidence of Soviet actions with respect to concurrent operations is insufficient fully to assess compliance with Soviet obligations under the ABM Treaty. However, the Soviet Union has conducted tests that have involved air defense radars in ABM-related activities. The large number, and consistency over time, of incidents of concurrent operation of ABM and SAM components, plus Soviet failure to accommodate fully U.S. concerns, indicate the USSR probably has violated the prohibition on testing SAM components in an ABM mode. In several cases this may be highly probable. This and other ABM-related activities suggest the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.
4. ABM Capability of Modern SAM Systems
Obligation: Under subparagraph (a) of Article VI of the ABM Treaty, each party undertakes not to give non-ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, or radars "capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode . . .''
Issue: The March 1987 Report examined whether the Soviet Union has tested a SAM system or component in an ABM mode or given it the capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory in violation of their legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. We have reexamined this issue.
Finding: The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the March 1987 Report that the evidence of Soviet actions with respect to SAM upgrade is insufficient to assess compliance with the Soviet Union's obligations under the ABM Treaty. However, this and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.
5. Rapid Reload of ABM Launchers
Obligation: The ABM Treaty limits to 100 the number of deployed ABM interceptor launchers and deployed interceptor missiles at launch sites. It does not limit the number of interceptor missiles that can be built and stockpiled. Paragraph 2, Article V, of the Treaty prohibits the development, testing or deployment of ``automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload'' of the permitted launchers.
Issue: The March 1987 Report examined whether the Soviet Union has developed, tested or deployed automatic, semi-automatic, or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers in violation of its legal obligations under the ABM Treaty. We have reexamined this issue.
Finding: The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the March 1987 Report that, on the basis of the evidence available, the USSR's actions with respect to the rapid reload of ABM launchers constitute an ambiguous situation as concerns its legal obligations under the ABM Treaty not to develop systems for rapid reload. The Soviet Union's reload capabilities are a serious concern. These and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.
6. ABM Components at Gomel
Obligation: To preclude the deployment of a territorial defense or providing the base for a territorial defense, the ABM Treaty provides that ABM components cannot be deployed outside of the one permitted ABM system deployment area or designated ABM test ranges for any purpose.
Issue: In March 1987, the U.S. Government observed the appearance of major parts of the original Flat Twin radar, including all of the modular sections of the radar body, and a Pawn Shop van at an electronics plant in Gomel, about 550 kilometers southwest of Moscow. The timing of the arrival of parts of the Flat Twin and Pawn Shop indicates that they came from the radars that were removed from the Sary Shagan Missile Test Center where, by January 1987, the Soviets were observed disassembling a number of these ABM components. U.S. concern regarding the issue of mobile ABM components previously raised with the Soviets could be exacerbated by this Soviet action.
Finding: The U.S. Government finds that the USSR's activities with respect to moving a Flat Twin ABM radar and a Pawn Shop van, a component of an ABM system, from a test range and initiating deployment at a location outside of an ABM deployment area or ABM test range constitutes a violation of the ABM Treaty. While it is not likely that the actions at Gomel are to support an ABM defense at that locality, deployment of such radars at Gomel to carry out any function is inconsistent with ABM Treaty obligations. This and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.
7. ABM Territorial Defense
Obligation: The ABM Treaty and Protocol allow each Party a single deployment area, explicitly permit modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components, and explicitly recognize the existence of ABM test ranges for the development and testing of ABM components. The ABM Treaty prohibits, however, the deployment of an ABM system for defense of the national territory of the Parties and prohibits the Parties from providing a base for such a defense.
Issue: The March 1987 Report examined whether the Soviets have deployed an ABM system for the defense of their territory or provided a base for such a defense. We have reexamined this issue.
Finding: The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment of the March 1987 Report that the aggregate of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related actions (e.g., radar construction, concurrent testing, SAM upgrade, ABM rapid reload, ABM mobility and deployment of ABM components to Gomel) suggests that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.
Biological Weapons Convention and 1925 Geneva Protocol
Chemical, Biological and Toxin Weapons
Treaty Status: The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 1925 Geneva Protocol are multilateral treaties to which both the United States and the Soviet Union are Parties. Soviet action not in accord with these treaties and customary international law relating to the 1925 Geneva Protocol are violations of legal obligations.
Obligation: The BWC bans the development, production, stockpiling or possession, and transfer of microbial or other biological toxins except for a small quantity for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. It imposes the same obligations in relation to weapons, equipment and means of delivery of agents or toxins. The 1925 Geneva Protocol and related rules of customary international law prohibit the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials, or devices and prohibits use of bacteriological methods of warfare.
Issue: The March 1987 Report examined whether the Soviets are in violation of provisions that ban the development, production, transfer, possession, and use of biological and toxin weapons and whether they have been responsible for the use of lethal chemicals. We have reexamined this issue.
Finding: The U.S. Government judges that continued activity during 1987 at suspect biological and toxin weapon facilities in the Soviet Union, and reports that a Soviet BW program may now include investigation of new classes of BW agents, confirm the conclusion of the March 1987 Report that the Soviet Union has maintained an offensive biological warfare program and capability in violation of its legal obligation under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972.
There have been no confirmed attacks with lethal chemical or toxins in Cambodia, Laos, or Afghanistan in 1987 according to our strict standards of evidence. Nonetheless, there is no basis for amending the March 1987 conclusion that, prior to this time, the Soviet Union has been involved in the production, transfer, and use of trichothecene mycotoxins for hostile purposes in Laos, Cambodia, and Afghanistan in violation of its legal obligation under international law as codified in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972.
Limited Test Ban Treaty
Underground Nuclear Test Venting
Treaty Status: The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Limited Test Ban Treaty) (LTBT) is a multilateral treaty that entered into force for the United States and the Soviet Union in 1963. Soviet actions not in accord with this treaty are violations of a legal obligation.
Obligation: The LTBT specifically prohibits nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. It also prohibits nuclear explosions in any other environment ``if such explosions cause radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.''
Issue: The March 1987 Report examined whether the USSR's underground nuclear tests have caused radioactive debris to be present outside of its territorial limits. We have reexamined this issue including evidence obtained since the Soviets resumed nuclear underground testing in February 1987.
Finding: The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the March 1987 Report that the Soviet Union's underground nuclear test practices resulted in the venting of radioactive matter on numerous occasions and caused radioactive matter to be present outside the Soviet Union's territorial limits in violation of its legal obligation under the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The Soviet Union failed to take the precautions necessary to minimize the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances despite numerous U.S. demarches and requests for corrective action. This practice has continued. Since the resumption of Soviet underground testing in February 1987 the United States has presented demarches to the Soviet Union on two separate occasions when unambiguously attributable venting has occurred.
Note: Identical letters were sent to Jim Wright, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and George Bush, President of the Senate. The unclassified version of the report which was required by Public Law No. 99 - 145, followed the President's letter.