June 10, 1985
To the Congress of the United States:
The attached classified report responds to a requirement in the FY - 85 Department of Defense Authorization Act (Section 1110 of P.L. 98 - 525) requesting a report that:
(A) describes the implications of the United States Ship Alaska's sea trials, both with and without the concurrent dismantling of older launchers of missiles with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles, for the current United States no-undercut policy on strategic arms and United States security interests more generally;
(B) assesses possible Soviet political, military, and negotiating responses to the termination of the United States no-undercut policy;
(C) reviews and assesses Soviet activities with respect to existing strategic offensive arms agreements; and
(D) makes recommendations regarding the future of United States interim restraint policy.
In accordance with our prior interim restraint policy, the United States has scrupulously lived within the SALT I and II agreements governing strategic offensive arms. The United States has fully kept its part of the bargain. By contrast, we have found and reported to the Congress that the Soviet Union has violated major arms control obligations, as fully documented in comprehensive reports to the Congress on this subject in January 1984 and February 1985. Multiple Soviet violations of the SALT II Treaty and of other agreements were fundamental considerations in assessing a future United States interim restraint policy.
The basic United States strategic goals remain unchanged. In the years ahead, the United States objective is a radical reduction in the levels and the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as on stabilization of the relationship between nuclear offensive and defensive arms, whether on earth or in space.
I firmly believe that if we are to put the arms reduction process on a firm and lasting foundation, our focus must remain on making best use of the promise provided by the current negotiations in Geneva. The policy outlined in my report, involving the establishment of an interim framework for truly mutual restraint and proportionate United States responses to uncorrected Soviet noncompliance, is specifically designed to go the extra mile in giving the Soviet Union the opportunity to join us in this vital endeavor.
I believe that this policy, addressed in the classified report and the unclassified fact sheet, both recognizes the recent views of the Congress and serves as a basis for bipartisan support.
The White House,
June 10, 1985.